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THE DEVELOPING EQUALITY
JURISPRUDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA
Karthy Govender * †
Apartheid was technically about separateness, but it was fundamentally
about inequality. The founding premise of the ideology was to preserve the
total hegemony of white South Africans. The liberation organizations opposing the apartheid regime sought to affirm that the country belonged to all
those that lived in it. Thus, it is unsurprising that the commitment to equality
is one of the founding values of the Constitution and an indelible thread
woven throughout the fabric of the Bill of Rights. After some misstatements
about certain rights being more important than others, courts have interpreted rights in the Bill of Rights to be of equal worth. However, the
centrality of the right to equality cannot be gainsaid.
I. The Developing Jurisprudence
Over the last fourteen years, the courts have incrementally developed
their equality jurisprudence. The drafters of the South African Constitution
had the immodest directive of drafting a bill of rights that protected and entrenched all universally accepted fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus,
different visions were fused into the Bill of Rights. A constraining vision
prevented state action that unreasonably and unjustifiably infringed rights,
while an egalitarian vision compelled calculated and measured steps by the
state towards the attainment of a fairer and more compassionate society.
When the process of interpreting the Constitution started, it was uncertain which vehicle would best achieve the object of improving the quality of
life of all persons. Hence, it was eminently prudent to allow each right to
develop incrementally, rather than to engage prematurely in an expansive
reflection that could have retarded the development of more relevant and
directly applicable rights. With the growth, development, and interpretation
of all of these rights, the vista became clearer, making an expansive development of principles appropriate. Apartheid unfairly discriminated based on
immutable characteristics and undermined human dignity. The need to repair and remedy this became inherent in the interpretation of the right to
equality.
The first decisions interpreting the right to equality involved a curious
assortment of litigants—persons unhappy with presumptions of negligence
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in the Forests Act; an insolvent German fugitive seeking to prevent property
in his wife’s name being presumed to be purchased by the insolvent; and a
convicted South African male endeavouring to be included in a general pardon for female prisoners with minor children. Out of these cases, a working
formula emerged to interpret the right to equality—section 9 of the Constitution, the first substantive right in the Bill of Rights.
II. Interpretation of Section 9
Section 9(1) affirms the right to the equal protection and benefit of the
law. However, section 9(3), the right not to be subject to unfair discrimination on the basis of listed and analogous grounds, is the centerpiece of the
developing equality jurisprudence. Courts protect substantive equality and
endorse affirmative measures to achieve it by defining equality to include
the full, equal enjoyment of rights. The right not to be subject to unfair discrimination is also binding on private and juristic persons, and the
Promotion of Equality Act and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of
2000 gives legislative effect to this right. Finally, in order to reduce the demanding burden of proof that plagues applicants in other equality
jurisdictions, there is a constitutional presumption that discrimination on
one of the listed grounds is unfair unless a defendant establishes the contrary.
Differentiation is objectionable if it imposes burdens or grants benefits
on the basis of categorizations that adversely impact the dignity of the complainant. Thus, equality jurisprudence distinguishes categorizations that
impact dignity from those that do not. Courts interpret section 9(1) to mean
that state differentiation is permissible if the categorization is rationally related to a legitimate state objective. Section 9(1) does not require the state to
satisfy a more exacting standard of reasonableness. Courts see the imposition of burdens on some and benefits on others as integral to the process of
governance. Provided that these differentiations do not adversely impact
dignity and amount to discrimination, courts are content to subject them to
non-exacting rationality review and afford a significant measure of latitude
to the government. Given the relative ease with which the state can justify
its actions under section 9(1), successful constitutional challenges using this
section are unusual. This is an appropriate judicial interpretation, as requiring a developing state to establish the reasonableness of every economic
choice and decision while operating within the discipline of an expansive
constitution would be unduly burdensome.
Differentiation that amounts to discrimination is regulated by section 9(3) of the Constitution. Section 9(3) prohibits unfair discrimination
based on race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin,
color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language, and birth (this list is not exhaustive). The listed grounds represent
past ways people have been marginalized and oppressed, and courts hold,
per section 9(5), that differentiation on any one of them amounts to a presumption of discrimination. The party differentiating on a listed ground
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must prove that the differentiation is fair and provide an explanation for its
decision.
In addition to the listed grounds, differentiation on analogous grounds
(immutable characteristics that have the potential to impact adversely on
human dignity) may also be constitutionally illegitimate. Examples of such
grounds include citizenship and HIV status. In contrast to the listed grounds
of differentiation, the presumption of unfairness does not operate with
analogous grounds. The complainant must prove that the ground on which
the differentiation occurs qualifies as an analogous ground and that the discrimination is unfair.
III. The Unfairness Standard
Unfairness has become the main area of contention in discrimination
matters as a result of the way courts have interpreted the constitutional right
to equality.
In determining whether discrimination is unfair, courts look at the impact the discrimination has on the complainant. Specifically, courts examine
whether the complainant belongs to a category of persons that were victims
of past patterns of discrimination, whether the measure impairs the dignity
of the complainant, and whether the measure is designed to achieve a laudable and important societal objective. The investigation of whether a
measure perpetuates systematic and entrenched patterns of discrimination
and the assessment of its impact on the complainant are often set against the
laudable social objective of the measure. For example, in the early decision
of President of South Africa v. Hugo, the presidential decision to discriminate against men by pardoning and releasing women from prison who had
children under the age of twelve was motivated by a genuine desire to assist
those women’s children. In fashioning a test, the Court noted the impact on
the complainant, but could not ignore the true purpose of the measure.
In City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, the Court considered the right to
be treated the same, the meaning of equality, and the constitutional imperatives of improving the quality of life. The residents of the predominantly
white part of Pretoria were charged a consumption-based tariff, while residents of the African townships were charged a flat rate per household. The
flat rate was significantly lower than the consumption-based tariff. White
residents argued that they were being unfairly discriminated on the basis of
race. While this was indirect discrimination, the court concluded that it was
not unfair. The Council had the constitutional mandate of equalizing facilities and services to all within its region. The facilities in the townships were
vastly inferior to that of ‘white Pretoria.’ The white residents, although a
political minority, were not victims of past patterns of discrimination. In the
circumstances, the Court held that it was not unfair to adopt the differential
tariff scheme as an interim measure until facilities were equalized. Walker
alerted South Africans to the possibility that, in realizing the objective of
achieving substantive equality, differently situated persons might be treated
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differently. Walker determined that this Constitution was neither blind to
color, nor the legacy of apartheid.
In 2004, Minister of Finance v. Van Heerden, the court clarified the relationship between affirmative action, the attainment of substantive equality,
and unfair discrimination. The Court held that remedial and restitutionary
equality were integral to the achievement of substantive equality. In other
words, “the provisions of section 9(1) and section 9(2) are complimentary;
both contribute to the constitutional goal of achieving equality to ensure
‘full and equal enjoyment of all rights.’ ” Courts assess remedial and affirmative action measures through the criteria in Van Heerden: For a
categorization to amount to a constitutionally permissible affirmative action
measure, it must target persons, or categories of persons, who have been
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, be designed to protect or advance
such persons, and promote the achievement of equality. The inherent flexibility of these criteria and the need to be context-sensitive could mean that
the rigor and robustness with which these criteria are applied would depend
on the extent to which the right to dignity has been affected by the categorization.
IV. Conclusion
In the United States, the category of differentiation determines the level
of scrutiny to which the conduct or law is subject. These levels range from
the rational basis test, to the intermediate level of scrutiny, and, finally, to
strict scrutiny analysis. The category of differentiation is often determinative
of the outcome of the matter. South Africa, however, has adopted a more
nuanced approach. Categorizations that do not impact dignity fall under the
mere differentiation standard, or rationality standard, of section 9(1). Categorizations that impact dignity fall under a section 9(3) analysis.
The level of scrutiny to determine whether measures fall within section 9(2) is flexible, as opposed to being an intermediate standard between
the non-exacting requirements of section 9(1) and the more exacting requirements of section 9(3). As pointed out in Van Heerden, if a measure falls
within section 9(2), it will not, in most instances, amount to unfair discrimination. Thus, if section 9(2) permits a measure, that measure is insulated
from a challenge on the basis of unfair discrimination in terms of section 9(3). It would be incongruent to have a measure sanctioned in one
section of the Constitution, yet prohibited in the next.
Recently, courts have more clearly connected the right to equality with
that of human dignity and the realization of socio-economic rights. Denying
social benefits to permanent residents is now deemed to be both unfair discrimination on the basis of citizenship and an unreasonable denial of the
right to social security. After a cautious start, the Court is prepared to interpret section 9 more expansively in order to obtain substantive equality.
Looking forward, it is probable that the right to equality will feature more
prominently in applications claiming greater access to socio-economic
rights.

